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Review Essay: Christopher Columbus
Langdell and the Public Law
Curriculum
Peter L. Strauss
Teaching materials in public law courses typically rely almost wholly on judicial opinions
as their primary materials, ampliﬁed by selections from the secondary literature. Constitutional
text may appear independently, but statutory text rarely does, and the materials of the legislative
process are generally absent. In administrative law course books, administrative opinions and the
materials of rulemaking rarely if ever appear. Yet these are primary materials with which lawyers
must deal with increasing frequency. Lawyers encounter statutes, rules, administrative policies,
and administrative disputes without judicial guidance, looking forward and not backward in
time. The growth of courses in legislation and the regulatory state oﬀers a chance for change from
limitations owing much to Christopher Columbus Langdell’s insistence that only judicial opinions
provided the appropriate raw material for law study. A review of the materials developed for the
course reveals only a few departures from this aged and, in the author’s judgment, impoverished
and fundamentally misleading pattern.

When asked to write a contribution to a festschrift celebrating Professor Jerry
Mashaw’s life of extraordinary administrative law scholarship, I was struck
by the sharp distinction he has long drawn between internal and external
administrative law—between those contributions to the regularity and legality
of agency behavior that emerge from its own institutions and practices, and the
constraints imposed by external actors, legislative, executive, and judicial. The
“systems of internal control and audit” he found common to nineteenth-century
governance in his magisterial account of early American administrative law1
are subordinated, if not suppressed, in today’s thinking about administrative
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help to Ian Sprague, CLS ’16 and for editorial assistance to Jenna Pavelec, Yale Law School
’17. A shorter version of this essay, more focused on the work of Professor Jerry Mashaw, will
appear as “Jerry Mashaw and the Public Law Curriculum” in Nicholas Parrillo, ed., AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT, a festschrift volume celebrating Professor Mashaw’s
work that is being published this year by Cambridge University Press. Initially written as it was
for a book chapter using political science notation practices, it lacks full footnoting, for which the
author begs the reader’s indulgence.
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law. “In our world of multiple transsubstantive statutes and ubiquitous
judicial review, we tend to think of our administrative constitution as a set
of external constraints upon agencies. We then relentlessly analyze these
external constraints as if they were the major determinants of agency eﬃcacy,
procedural fairness and legal legitimacy. Yet, in many ways it is the internal law
of administration—the memoranda, guidelines, circulars and customs within
agencies that most powerfully mold the behavior of administrative oﬃcials.”2
Not Judicial Control of Administrative Action,3 but getting inside administration
has been the hallmark of Mashaw’s scholarship from its beginning4 to the
present day.5 A public law curriculum with the same ends would permit
students to encounter administrative law in just this way, as it is encountered
by administrative actors and the public. It would engage them directly with
their materials, require them to “see” the relationships within agencies, and
between them and legislatures or central executives, just as the people in the
agencies and those bodies do. The very ﬁrst teaching materials Jerry Mashaw
edited provided just such encounters for his students. He did not ask students,
to the virtual exclusion of other perspectives, to encounter these matters just
through the eyes of reviewing courts, or in relation to what the judiciary might
command.
This, and the recent growth of required courses on legislation and regulation,
suggested the possible interest of an essay exploring the extent to which
American law students, through the years, might encounter legislatures and
agencies other than through the eyes of the courts, which can be censorious
and are inevitably retrospective and oriented to incidental litigation. To what
extent have American law students been invited to view the work of legislatures
and agencies from the perspectives of those lawmaking institutions themselves
rather than from a judicial perspective? Although Hart and Sacks’s The Legal
Process6 invited a brief detour in the middle of the past century, even today the
law school curriculum endlessly invites attention to courts and the means by
which they settle (that is to say, make) law. Well over a century ago, Harvard’s
innovative Christopher Columbus Langdell treated law as a science whose
2.

Id.

3.

LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).

4.

Jerry L. Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public Choice Concerning
Federally Aided Highway Construction, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1973); Jerry L. Mashaw, Welfare Reform
and Local Administration of Aid to Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971). So too,
two of his prize-winning books. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE
FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) .

5.

JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).

6.

HENRY MELVIN HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). This work was ﬁnally brought into print
in 1994 by Foundation Press. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds. 1994).
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raw materials were appellate judicial decisions alone.7 Has the Langdellian
imperative to use only cases as the primary materials of law study prevailed in
the study of legislatures and agencies as well? Do the materials of today’s new
courses invite direct attention to these other institutions and their ways, before
which lawyers so often must appear? Or do new course materials continue to
present legislatures and agencies primarily through decided cases in which
judges looked backwards over some particular, completed piece of work?
I. Beginnings
Court-centered instruction has been with us since Langdell’s innovations
captured law school curricula. Administrative law ﬁrst appeared in them
around the turn of the twentieth century and, as Kevin Stack has forcefully
reminded us,8 its birth coincided with the Langdellian ascendancy. In the
earliest administrative law casebooks,9 says Stack, Ernst Freund
emphasized both the role of legislation and public administration, including
the methods agencies use to make decisions, as critical features of administrative
law. Because exercises of administrative power must be authorized by
legislation, Freund made clear that statutory construction was to be a central
occupation for administrative law. “[T]he operation of general principles
of administrative law is constantly aﬀected, and frequently controlled by,
the language of statutes.” As a result, Freund emphasized that statutory
construction thus deserved a prominent place in a course on administrative
law. Indeed, Freund argued, in light of the “rapid and enormous growth of
public regulation of all kinds,” that principles of statutory construction are “as
deserving of careful study as common-law principles.”10

But the University of Chicago’s brand-new law school had imported Freund’s
Dean from Harvard, precisely to bring the case method with him. Although
“Freund bemoaned the identiﬁcation of the ﬁeld of administrative law
with judicial decisions,”11 the Dean would not permit him to oﬀer a course
7.

Langdell’s approach excludes “the array of social, economic, and political forces that
interacted with law. In Lawrence Friedman’s view, this made ‘Langdell’s science of law . . .
a geology without rocks, an astronomy without stars.’” Stephen Dow, There’s Madness in the
Method: A Commentary on Law, Statistics, and the Nature of Legal Education, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 579, 586
(2004), citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 617 (2d ed. 1985).

8.

See Kevin M. Stack, Lessons from the Turn of the Twentieth Century for First-Year Courses on Legislation and
Regulation, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 28 (2015).

9.

ERNST FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1911)

10.

Stack, supra note 8, at 34.

11.

Id., citing Ernst Freund, The Correlation of Work for Higher Degrees in Graduate Schools and Law Schools,
11 ILL. L. REV. 301, 306 (1916).
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on administrative law in the law school curriculum until he had produced
materials based on cases.12 Freund complied.13
“Cases only” remained dominant as the New Deal began, when Harvard
Law School professors Felix Frankfurter and J. Forrester Davison published
Cases and Other Materials on Administrative Law.14 In its preface one ﬁnds these apt
words:
Since we are dealing with law in the making, this collection draws upon all
sources that help to make law—cases, statutes, legislative debates, rules and
regulations, legal writings and lay comment . . . . One cannot, then, stress too
much the tentative stages of hypothesis and generalization in Administrative
Law, and the predominant importance of knowing the anatomy and
physiology of the law-making agencies that are neither legislature not courts
but partake of the functions of both.15

This is well said, but well over ninety percent of the book’s 1150 pages present
judicial decisions, edited but (in the Harvard style of the time) uncommented
upon; and with the exception of introductory excerpts from the classic
separation-of-powers literature, a brief ICC order, a couple of short statutory
passages and twenty-ﬁve pages of extracts from House of Lords debates, even
the exceptional pages have as their subject courts and judicial review. The
book presents “the anatomy and physiology of the law-making agencies” only
as judges perceived them in the particular litigation that happened to have
been put before them. Students see statutes and regulations only through their
eyes. They view no legislative history independent of judicial preselection,
no materials of rulemaking, or (with that brief and solitary exception) no
administrative decision. Freund’s basic criticism of the book, that the materials
are about constitutional law and judicial review, not administrative action as
such, seems thoroughly justiﬁed.
Walter Gellhorn, intellectual father of the Administrative Procedure Act,
would publish the ﬁrst edition of his enduring teaching materials eight years
12.

Stack, supra note 8, at 40, citing WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 72 (1982) and Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s
Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 617-18 (2007).

13.

Only excerpts from judicial opinions appear in Freund’s ﬁrst edition. The second,
published in 1928, added a few notes and statutory texts, and two excerpts from the annual
reports of the ICC. ERNST FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1928). Freund
stuck to his principles in important respects: The ﬁrst half of each edition was devoted
to “Administrative Power and Action,” before reaching (wholly judicial) “Relief against
Administrative Action.” Issues of constitutional law (e.g., “delegation”) were essentially left
to courses in that subject.

14.

FELIX FRANKFURTER & J. FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1932). Ernst Freund, to whom the book is dedicated, wrote a notwholly-appreciative review. Ernst Freund, Book Review, 46 HARV. L. REV. 167 (1932) (noting
its limited focus on constitutional issues and the courts).

15.

FRANKFURTER & DAVISON, supra note 14 at vii-viii.
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later.16 Here, too, judicial opinions dominate—although, in what would come
to be a recognizable Columbia style, they might be more stringently edited,
and rich notes and text discussions frequently appear. An introductory essay
and secondary source excerpts marshal strong arguments for the necessity and
propriety of administrative agencies, and against the bar’s then near-hysteria
respecting administrative adjudications (rulemaking was not yet a subject).
Although strongly evoking the likelihood of good faith and regularity in public
servants’ behavior, the materials neither promise nor provide attention to the
internal law of administration; nor do they provide primary materials reﬂecting
external controls other than judicial ones. After about 300 pages on issues of
constitutional structure (both separation and delegation of powers), the next
400 pages would have extensively engaged Gellhorn’s students various issues
about the law of administrative hearings—notice, fair hearing, and ﬁndings—
before reaching two ﬁnal chapters given over to judicial controls. This
chooses Freund’s organization over Frankfurter’s. Note, however, that only
administrative adjudication at the hearing stage—that is, the agency equivalent
of trials—was considered, and its consideration came from the perspective
of judicial overseers. This constituted a powerful argument in the bar’s
contemporary debates about the propriety of administrative adjudications,
but was still very much in thrall to the commitment to cases as the material of
legal study.
II. The Legal Process
By midcentury, other materials had begun to intrude into the law school
classroom. Scholarly excerpts were common; primary law materials other than
cases and direct attention to institutions other than courts, less so. The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law by Henry M. Hart, Jr., and
Albert M. Sacks17 was a notable exception. Enormously inﬂuential although
unprinted in its time18—taught from mimeographed pages—the material
from its very beginning confronted law students with other institutions and
their work, materials of the legal process that had not been predigested by
courts. The authors’ famous introductory problem, “The Signiﬁcance of an
Institutional System: The Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes,” is particularly
striking in this respect. Preceding the three judicial decisions by which
“the case” was ultimately resolved were forty pages of materials engaging
students with factual background, statutory text and its legislative history in
some detail, regulatory text from the Department of Agriculture, important
16.

WALTER GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (1940).

17.

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).

18.

Its intellectual roots and inﬂuence are thoroughly explored in the lengthy essay with which
William Eskridge and the late Philip Frickey prefaced the published edition, An Historical and
Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, IN HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li-cxxxvi (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994).
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information about state law and trade practice, and, ﬁnally, the Department’s
administrative decision.
While two later chapters understandably consider “The Courts as Places
of Initial Resort for Solving Problems Which Fail of Private Solution” and
“The Role of the Courts in the Interpretation of Statutes,” four other chapters
are organized around other instrumentalities and the primary materials
of their working. Only seven opinions appear in the 158 pages devoted to
private ordering, consuming less than twenty percent of them; they appear
after students’ have been asked to consider, independent of them, other
materials from other actors. Three hundred ﬁfteen pages on legislatures and
the legislative process introduce their structure and work in detail. Many of
these pages are textual, describing legislative process, actors, and problems,
not judicial perspectives. The problems place students in or before legislative
bodies, and the three judicial opinions in the chapter appear as elements of
the background notes students must work through to respond to problems
set in legislatures. These notes devote many more pages to primary legislative
materials—statutory language (as enacted or in draft) to be read independent
of judicial views, legislative history documents or testimony, legislative
procedural rules, etc.
The much shorter and admittedly incomplete chapter titled “The Executive
Branch and the Administrative Process” put students before executive actors.19
Given factual background, statutory provisions, and executive order, they were
required to advise President Truman on the seizure of steel plants before being
permitted to read Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.20 Then, with Baltimore
city ordinances and no judicial opinions in hand, they were asked to analyze
two problems involving issues that, in part, would reach the Supreme Court
in Frank v. Maryland21 the year after the tentative edition appeared. Finally, as
agency legal advisors, they had to read agency decisional documents and an
independent discussion of the legislative history of the pertinent provision to
comprehend brief excerpts from a Supreme Court opinion.
Such problems were essential to Hart and Sacks’s remarkable
accomplishment. They repeatedly required students to study primary
materials other than judicial opinions and to imagine interacting with primary
actors other than judges—materials and actors that had to be seen prior to and
independent of their coming into judicial view. The materials’ insistence on
student understanding of numerous institutions, all acting within and upon or
under law but doing so on their own terms, was their perhaps underappreciated
contribution. Given the relative underdevelopment of “The Executive Branch
and the Administrative Process,” one cannot conﬁdently ﬁnd here a turn back
to the internal law of administrative agencies; but the overall approach strongly
suggests that this is where a later edition, tentative or not, would have landed.
19.

See, e.g., id. at 1046, 1059-60, 1109.

20.

343 U.S. 579 (1952).

21.

359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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III. And After a Generation
Three works of the mid-1970s permit an impressionistic assessment of the
impact that this approach did or did not have in focusing the attention of
public law teaching materials on other-than-judicial actors. One ﬁnds movement from the case-centered norm, but not to the extent Hart and Sacks
appeared to promise. Consider in that regard the following three examples.
A. Walter Gellhorn & Clark Byse, Administrative Law—Cases and
Comments (6th ed. 1974)22
Hart and Sacks’s approach might have inﬂuenced the Sixth Edition of
Gellhorn & Byse, Administrative Law—Cases and Comments. In 1940, Gellhorn had
worked with Hart and another on materials for the courses on legislation
they were teaching, in which the problem method was the chief pedagogical
innovation.23 But where Hart argued for directly engaging students with
legislatures and their materials, Gellhorn insist[ed] on more elaborate,
doctrinally focused organization. His co-editor Clark Byse had been a colleague
of Hart and Sacks’s since 1957. Yet aside from its use of a short supplement
setting problems24 (but not providing primary materials), the 1974 edition of
Gellhorn-Byse revealed few signs of Hart and Sacks’s inﬂuence. Throughout,
it required its students to respond to and evaluate judicial decisions and
commentary rather than engage in legal practice outside of court. Early pages
introduced them to Congress’s extrastatutory (budgetary and oversight)
controls over agency action, and to the possibilities for presidential controls.
Even so, the predominant focus was on doctrine, not institutions and their
functioning. Students would read more than 400 pages of material on judicial
control of administrative action before turning to that action itself; the internal
structures of agencies and issues about their operation, seen through judicial
eyes, appeared only in the ﬁnal chapter.
B. Jerry Mashaw & Richard Merrill, Introduction to the American Public
Law System (1975)25
The Legal Process appears to have had a greater inﬂuence on Mashaw and
Merrill’s Introduction to the American Public Law System—materials that like today’s
legislation and regulation materials were designed speciﬁcally for the ﬁrst
year of law school. A course treating legislation and administrative action
as subjects independently worthy of early, serious study, side by side, gave
its students a clearer picture of the actual American legal system than a ﬁrst22.

WALTER GELLHORN & CLARK BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—CASES
1974).

23.

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL
PROCESS, in HART & SACKS, supra note 18, at li, lxxiv.

24.

WALTER GELLHORN, CLARK BYSE & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROBLEMS
USE IN CONJUNCTION WITH GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 6TH ED (1978).

25.

JERRY L. MASHAW & RICHARD A. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS (1975).
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year curriculum wholly committed to cases and the common law. The editors
stressed their “functional perspective,”26 saying their “larger and primary aim
is to bring an integration of administrative law into the larger fabric of the
legal order”27 by “integrat[ing] analysis of the administrative process with ways
of thinking about the legislative process.”
Correspondingly, their book began with a study of the development
and implementation of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act. Before reaching
highly contested Supreme Court opinions and extensive notes on statutory
interpretation technique, this chapter obliged students to understand the
development of a complicated set of statutory materials controlling discharges
into navigable waterways and to advise an Assistant Attorney General about
several issues of interpretation and policy. After the cases, materials on
criminal enforcement of the act against polluters brought them to discussions
between government prosecutors and congressional committees. A fourth
section, on administrative implementation, turned on a presidential executive
order that directed the creation of a discharge permit program and assigned
responsibilities for it to various agencies, congressional testimony about the
program then established, and statutory materials addressing the President’s
authority to reorganize governmental agencies. The chapter ended with a
discussion of the congressional reaction. Cases, yes; but the students had to
read and interpret for themselves relatively complex statutory text, and they
encountered as other primary material a presidential executive order and
several excerpts from congressional testimony, all in the service of the authors’
“larger and primary aim.”
Following this chapter and two considering judicial restrictions on legislative
processes, almost 100 pages of materials on agency rulemaking—the subject
virtually missing from Gellhorn-Byse—preceded only slightly longer materials on
agency adjudication. In all these chapters, it is fair to say “judicial control
of” were the words that introduced virtually every chapter subheading. But
then came a chapter on “agency choice of mode of action,” in which, again,
the students’ gaze was strongly diverted from the courts. Perhaps presaging
Merrill’s two years of service as Chief Counsel to the FDA, beginning in
the year these materials were published, more than eighty pages eﬀectively
placed the student inside the FDA, dealing with its implementation of 1962
amendments to its basic statute. The students had to master extensive statutory
and regulatory texts and administrative history to deal eﬀectively with a course
of judicial decisions interpreting the statute. The materials’ consistent focus
on FDA actions, interpretations and regulatory dilemmas invited continuous
discussion of the FDA’s internal administrative law. In these pages, “judicial
control of” was the secondary, not primary, focus; the cases were among the
building blocks provided for an FDA attorney, not doctrine to be learned.
26.

Id. at xvii.

27.

Id. at xviii.
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C. Hans Linde & George Bunn, Legislative and Administrative Processes (1976)28
Another book suggesting the Hart and Sacks model was Hans Linde
and George Bunn’s Legislative and Administrative Processes, which appeared the
following year. These materials more fully presaged today’s leg-reg courses
in their thorough treatment of Congress and administrative agencies as
institutions, and their disciplined attention to political as well as legal controls
on agency behavior. Indeed, while students often encountered law through
judicial opinions as well as statutory and regulatory texts, the latter often
dominated.29 What they did not ﬁnd as doctrinal headings were “statutory
interpretation,”30 “scope of review,” or “access to judicial review.” Issues
concerning courts as courts, judicial processes as subject matter, were left to the
many other law school courses in which they would appear. While in relation to
administrative action the focus of the book (like the others of its time) was on
adjudication and not rulemaking, “it touches on administrative adjudications
only insofar as they diﬀer from litigation in courts.”31 No students studying
these materials could have failed to leave them without understanding that
statutory and administrative materials must be dealt with independently of
judicial decisions, or that legislatures and agencies were institutions acting in
both a political and a legal environment, and in themselves worthy of study.
D. Langdell Triumphant
Neither Mashaw-Merrill nor Linde-Bunn survived. Mashaw and his coauthors transformed their work into a standard set of administrative law
teaching materials, abandoning its innovative turn. The book has returned
to the legislature only in its most recent edition.32 The Linde-Bunn materials
had supplanted a ﬁrst-year course long taught at Wisconsin33 (where Bunn
28.

HANS A. LINDE & GEORGE BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES (1976).

29.

The detailed Table of Contents for Chapter 3, “Legislative Process,” for example, listed
as primary materials for its 261 pages: 15 cases, 16 statutes or bills, 18 passages from
committee reports or hearing testimony, 24 excerpts from the literature (all but two focused
on legislatures, not courts or judicial doctrine), and six documents generated within the
executive branch. Chapter 6, “The Administrative Agency—Responsibility and Control”
showed a similar imbalance between cases (two) and documents generated within the
executive or legislative branches (16), and literature excerpts concerning them (seven).
Other chapters were more heavily case-oriented, but not to the exclusion of primary and
secondary materials generated by or about the political branches.

30.

The sixth of seven subsections in Chapter 3, “Legislative Process,” dealt with “Legislative
History,” approaching it from the perspective of understanding how judicial uses of it may
aﬀect legislators’ behavior. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 149 (2001), rather than as an element of instruction about statutory interpretation by
courts.

31.

LINDE & BUNN, supra note 28, at xviii.

32.

JERRY MASHAW, RICHARD MERRILL, PETER SHANE, ELIZABETH MAGILL, MARIANO-FLORENTINO
CUELLAR & NICHOLAS PARRILLO, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM:
CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2014).

33.
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was Dean) using materials rivaling Hart-Sacks; that earlier course had become
unpopular with students, who thought it political science, not real law. The
substitution did not catch hold. Linde-Bunn never reached a second edition.
Habituation to the case method, perhaps, and/or the diﬃculty of engaging
students with institutions other than courts—with statutory and administrative
materials as primary sources for learning and application—appear to have
claimed it as a victim.34
The Langdellian commitment to courts and their opinions as the proper
medium of law study—indeed the implicit proposition that the common law
is what law is about—has dominated law schools’ ﬁrst-year curricula ever
since his time, even as the practice of law, if it ever was that unidimensional,
has shifted steadily toward statutory regimes and their administrators. In a
remarkable conversation before Harvard Law students in the fall of 2015,
Justice Elena Kagan and Professor John Manning recalled their Harvard
education in the mid-’80s.35 At the school of Hart and Sacks, the curriculum
was devoid of disciplined, and certainly of ﬁrst-year, attention to statutes.
Until ten years ago, Harvard Law School’s ﬁrst-year curricular requirements
remained essentially as they had been for a century (civil procedure, contracts,
criminal law, property and torts). Hence, the “case method” remained ﬁrmly in
place—altered, to be sure, by the eﬀects legal realism, critical legal studies, law
and economics, and other challenges had in shattering the “science” illusion,
but juricentric nonetheless. Indeed, when in 2006 Harvard introduced a
required course in legislation and regulation into the ﬁrst-year curriculum, the
Langdellian commitment remained in place. Professors John Manning and
Matthew Stephenson self-consciously agreed that the materials they prepared
for the new course would “follow the familiar, case-oriented approach—relying
on appellate opinions and notes and comments on those opinions as the main
course materials and the focus of the discussion.”36 At Yale, today’s required
curriculum remains essentially what it was when I was a student there ﬁftyfour years ago—and long before that. First-year students must still take civil
procedure, constitutional law, contracts and torts in the ﬁrst semester, as I
did, and criminal law and administration (but no longer property) at some
UNDERGRADUATES AND BEGINNING LAW STUDENTS (1940), succeeded by CARL A. AUERBACH &
SAMUEL MERMIN, LEGAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL,
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1956). Like the tentative edition of
HART & SACKS, supra note 17, both were informally produced but, centered on Wisconsin law
and the particular problems of workers’ compensation, neither was widely circulated. For
many years, the book by LINDE & BUNN, supra note 28, was also used as part of the ﬁrst-year
course materials at the University of Oregon’s School of Law.
34.

I am indebted to William Whitford, Professor Emeritus at Wisconsin, for the information
preceding this footnote. (Emails to the author, Jan. 12 and 23, 2015). A quarter-century later,
Columbia’s regulatory state course would suﬀer the same fate, for the same reasons.

35.

See Harvard Law Sch., The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.

36.

John F. Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation & Regulation and Reform of the First Year,
65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (2015).
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subsequent point. Other than these courses, encounters with public law and
its primary materials are not required.
IV. The Current Day
A. Courses in Administrative Law and Legislation
Fast-forward to the current day, and one ﬁnds strongly revived interest
in studying legislation and, in particular, statutory interpretation—thanks in
good part to the work of Jerry Mashaw’s colleague William Eskridge, Jr., and
his co-authors. Administrative law is ﬁnding its way into bar examinations
and is increasingly understood by students to be a required course, whether or
not their curriculum so provides. But the doctrinal and judicial orientation of
these courses remains strong. That is certainly the case with the administrative
law materials I have co-edited since the seventh edition’s appearance in 1979.37
While our book deals extensively with events at the agency level before
explicitly reaching the issues of judicial review, and includes considerable
discussion of both internal agency action and relations with its political
overseers, virtually all its primary materials are decided cases and its focus
is on judicial doctrine. Only the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure
Act, and Executive Order 12,866 and its amendments are presented as texts
students must deal with independently of judicial decisions. In teaching the
course, however, I insist that students become familiar with agency and White
House websites, and view the rulemaking process as it is occurring through
those lenses. The Rivers and Harbors Act, along with attention to Congress
(understood as an institution on its own) and to the FDA’s struggles with
the 1972 Amendments to its fundamental statutes, all long ago disappeared
from Jerry Mashaw’s casebook, now in its Seventh Edition (2014) and retitled
Administrative Law—The American Public Law System—Cases and Materials. Here, too,
the primary materials students encounter are with few exceptions judicial
decisions, and the understandings they strive for, consequently, are doctrinal.
They do not encounter a notice of proposed rulemaking or an adopted rule,
except as judges or the authors might describe them. A brief section on
electronic rulemaking does not even identify the URL for the government’s
e-rulemaking site, much less suggest that students observe a rulemaking there.
Besides Executive Order 12,866 and its impacts on rulemaking—issues not
open to judicial review—attention to administrative law teaching materials,
generally, follows this pattern.
For courses on legislation, contemporary teaching materials typically
address Congress as a functioning institution and the problems of statutory
interpretation. The ﬁrst can hardly be accomplished by reading judicial
decisions; some combination of legislative documents, exposition, and
secondary literature excerpts must be dominant. For statutory interpretation,
by comparison, the case method reasserts itself. Of course judges do read
37.

PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF, CYNTHIA R. FARINA & GILLIAN E. METZGER, GELLHORN
BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (11th ed. 2011) (current edition).
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statutes, and the continuing controversies among them about how this might
best be done require making one’s students aware of that.38 But are they the
only ones to do so?
Today, reading statutes (and regulations) constitutes a major part of
lawyers’ work, if not the majority, as compared with reading cases. In any
uncertain matter, lawyers and their clients must usually read them before
their meaning has been judicially resolved. Very often those statutes are ﬁrst
read by agencies, both within themselves and in dealings with the public. Are
the students of today’s legislation courses often required to read statutes for
themselves, before judges get to them, with such aids to understanding as
may then be available? This, in eﬀect, was what the Legal Process materials,
Mashaw-Merrill, and Linde-Bunn required of them. But the teaching materials of
today’s legislation courses often require students to dig out the statute being
interpreted from the interstices of a judicial opinion, with only such elements
of it as the opinion writer(s) found relevant to include.39 If the materials
provide statutory text before the opinion, as do Professor Eskridge’s two
new editions, discussed below, they are not given a problem to consider that
might lead them independently to see statutory issues, or the other materials a
private lawyer or an agency lawyer would certainly consult; they get no sense
of the past history of the problem, other statutes that might be relevant, or
its political or legislative history (again, besides such elements as the opinion
writer(s) chose to include). Students are not, in other words, invited to read
the statutes for themselves.
B. The New Course in Legislation and Regulation
The past quarter-century, starting perhaps with my school’s ultimately
failing eﬀort to create a required ﬁrst-year course on the regulatory state, has
seen a steady movement toward courses on legislation and regulation—today’s
predominant sources of law—as required elements of ﬁrst-year curricula.40
The phenomenon is a long-overdue reaction to the continued dominance of
common-law, judicially oriented doctrinal analysis courses in the ﬁrst year,
conveying to entering students a strikingly inaccurate sense of the current
world of law.41 At least six sets of law school teaching materials have recently
38.

See Peter L. Strauss, Robert Katzmann’s Judging Statutes, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443 (2015) (book
review).

39.

Professor Eskridge’s two new editions, discussed infra, now frequently depart from this
pattern by placing the relevant statutory texts before opinions interpreting them. Focusing
student attention on what will prove to be the problem for the court by brieﬂy also stating a
problem could further ingrain the habits of careful reading any attorney must cultivate.

40.

Abbe R. Gluck, The Ripple Eﬀect of “Leg-Reg” on the Study of Legislation and Administrative Law in
the Law School Curriculum, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 121, 126-27 (2015) (showing that twenty-one law
schools of the top ninety-nine, according to the 2014 U.S. News Rankings, currently require a
course on legislation or leg-reg in the ﬁrst-year curriculum).

41.

The impact of distorted ﬁrst impressions can be enduring. Consider the experience at McGill
Law School, which for many years oﬀered its students degrees qualifying graduates for both
common-law and civil-law qualiﬁcation. I visited there earlier this century, a visit that led to
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been published for use in connection with the ﬁrst-year courses on legislation
and regulation that are increasingly ﬁnding their way into that year’s required
curriculum.42 All present political institutions and agencies, statutes and
regulations as central actors and elements in the legal world, but they oﬀer a
wide range of approach. To what extent, however, do these curricular changes
presage a change from the Langdellian commitments to using appellate
judicial decisions and to teaching doctrine?
1. John F. Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation43
Langdell dies hard at Harvard, as we have seen. In their preface, Professors
Manning and Stephenson describe their purpose as being “to teach students
both how federal statutory and regulatory law is made, and how judges and
administrative interpreters construe these legal materials.”44 Notice that this
teaching is to be about “how judges and administrative interpreters construe,”
and not about how lawyers do. Consistent with Langdellian premises,
Manning and Stephenson lead their students almost invariably to see issues
gazing backward in relation to the already explained interpretations of judges
and administrators, and not forward, in the absence of ﬁxed meanings, to
advise clients about important choices. That the purpose of learning “how
judges and administrative interpreters construe” statutes dominates the work
is suggested by the omission of legislation from the list of courses in the
upper-level curriculum for which it might serve as a foundation,45 and also
my Peter L. Strauss, Transsystemia—Are We Approaching a New Langdellian Moment? Is McGill Showing
the Way?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 161 (2006). There, I learned that when this was done in a fouryear program, with students spending their ﬁrst year studying beginning courses in the
system of their choice and their second year studying the same issues in the other, with two
years of electives to follow, graduates were marked by their choices. If they had begun on
the common-law side, they graduated as common lawyers who knew some civil law, and vice
versa. When McGill then converted its program into a three-year program, in which ﬁrstyear courses were oﬀered transsystemically—that is, on a problem basis, with civilian and
common-law materials presented side by side (and bilingually) as equally possible means
of response—it found that these self-identiﬁcations to one system or the other disappeared. .
42.

All from a 2014 AALS meeting panel on Leg-Reg Courses and the Core Curriculum, 65 J. LEG.
EDUC. 1 (2015). See James J. Brudney, Legislation and Regulation in the Core Curriculum: A Virtue or a
Necessity?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (2015); Kevin M. Stack, Lessons from the Turn of the Twentieth Century
for First-Year Courses on Legislation and Regulation, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 28 (2015); John F. Manning
& Matthew Stephenson, Legislation & Regulation and Reform of the First Year, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45
(2015); Dakota S. Rudesill, Christopher J. Walker & Daniel P. Tokaji, A Program in Legislation,
65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 70 (2015); Deborah A. Widiss, Making Sausage: What, Why and How to Teach
about Legislative Process in a Legislation or Leg-Reg Course, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 96 (2015); Gluck, supra
note 40.

43.

JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION
2013).

44.

Id. at v.

45.

In her contribution to the Journal of Legal Education Symposium, Professor Gluck, supra note
40, reports that the new leg-reg courses appear to be displacing legislation as an upperclass
course, but not administrative law. Id. at 153. To the extent those courses examine the
institutional functioning of legislatures, that loss counsels assuring that the new courses

AND

REGULATION (2nd ed.

170

Journal of Legal Education

by the materials’ virtual absence of attention to Congress and administrative
agencies as institutions functioning on their own internal law.46 Consideration
of internal agency processes of decision, as distinct from statutory and judicial
requirements for them, is simply missing. Other than the Constitution and
relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the only nonjudicial
materials used as primary readings are Executive Order 12,866 and a
presidential memorandum on clean-water protection. The materials simply
fail to engage students with primary materials other than judicial opinion.
The materials are, however, very well-adapted to teaching “how judges
and administrative interpreters construe [statutory and regulatory law].”
The ﬁrst two chapters address statutory interpretation, the fourth (largely)
APA interpretation in the rulemaking context, and the ﬁfth judicial review of
agency statutory interpretation.47 Taking the ﬁrst chapter as an example, its
introductory section, after well framing the general questions students will
want to consider, opens with the example of TVA v. Hill,48 a case that preceded
the revival of sharp controversy over interpretive technique yet opens many of
these questions. And here, atypically, students are asked to read the statutory
provisions at issue (albeit they are not given facts or a problem that might
help them to do so before encountering the court’s reading). Note materials
point out the several interpretive tools the Justices used and the background
and subsequent history of the statute, suggesting the essentially retrospective
application of the Endangered Species Act the decision entailed. The brief
introduction to Congress’s legislative process is also a part of this section.
The second section of the chapter, “The Letter Versus the Spirit of the Law,”
makes clear both the breadth of scholarship brought to this enterprise and the
balance of its authors in engaging students with it. John Manning is deservedly
regarded as the leading academic scholar supporting the “new textualism,”
the letter as against the spirit, but the case selections, richly annotated notes,
and questions posed should leave students with a sense of the tensions, of
the strong arguments on each side of this divide, of some movement toward
an accommodating center, a new textually constrained purposivism alongside
consider legislatures as functioning institutions, as well as the appropriate means by which
outsiders may deal with their end products.
46.

There is no hint here of congressional disarray or of the realities of legislative drafting and
processing revealed in Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman’s pathbreaking scholarship. See
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Lisa
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014). A good deal
more emerges, however, in the interstices of their subsequent discussions of the debates over
the use of legislative history.

47.

This chapter essentially is devoted to Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Statutory interpretation by agencies, whose techniques arguably are inﬂuenced by their
responsibilities and by their continuous contact with both their constitutive statutes and
with Congress, is discussed only as it may inﬂuence judicial interpretation.

48.

437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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a new (and more moderate) textualism. Students are consistently engaged
in a real debate, with well-chosen cases to illustrate it and no clear outcome
required. Section III, “What Is the Text?” (Scientiﬁc or Ordinary Meaning?
Legal Terms of Art? Colloquial Meaning or Dictionary Meaning), Section IV,
“Legislative History” (Post New-Deal Approach, Textualist Critique, The New
Synthesis), and Section V, “The Judicial Power and Equitable Interpretation,”
continue in the same vein. Again, the materials are all judicial opinions. The
section on legislative history fully and fairly presents the history of use and
abuse of legislative history; what it does not ever do is present students with
the challenge of considering legislative history documents on their own rather
than seeing them through the selective eyes of opinion writers.
Other than the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the only nonjudicial materials used as primary readings in
Manning-Stephenson are Executive Order 12,866 and a presidential memorandum
on clean-water protection, as the principal readings for a section on “Presidential
Control of Agencies.” The Executive Order is introduced by way of a
thoughtful history adumbrating the political debates over its appropriateness
and uses, but without a suggestion to students of a posture they might take in
reading it. For example, they might be asked
 As an OIRA administrator, are you now in a position to control the
subjects on which rulemaking occurs?
 If you are a desk oﬃcer in OIRA, what opportunities are you given to
inﬂuence the outcomes of a particular agency rulemaking?
 If you are an agency rulemaker, how will these requirements inﬂuence
the outcomes you reach? Public participation in your rulemakings?
 What, if any, defenses will you have against White House “meddling”?
The notes following the Order ﬁrst take four-and-a-half pages for a balanced
and richly annotated account of the debates over the appropriateness of
presidential control, and then give similar space and attention to the debates
over the use of cost-beneﬁt analysis. President Clinton’s Memorandum on Clean
Water Protection, directing EPA and other agencies to take certain deﬁned
steps to protect the quality of recreational water bodies, serves to introduce a
further discussion of the appropriate level of presidential inﬂuence or control
over matters statutorily assigned to agencies for decision. The questions are
well-identiﬁed, and the literature bearing on them fully and fairly presented.
The materials do not, but of course the instructor could, invite students to
consider what their agency should/must do on receiving such a memorandum.
A colleague teaching the upperclass oﬀering in administrative law expressed
some concern to me last spring about the overlap of her syllabus with what she
understood had been dealt with in a ﬁrst-year elective taught from ManningStephenson. Probably if one knew one’s students had studied its thorough
treatment of the Constitution’s bearing on agency rulemaking and of standards
of judicial review of rulemaking and Chevron—more than 200 pages of the book
in each case—one could feel free to spend more time on issues not at all touched
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(e.g., due process, APA adjudication, agency enforcement, agency decision
processes, information acquisition and FOIA, access to judicial review) and to
deepen the treatment of rulemaking and its associated statutory and executive
controls. Thus, the overlap with administrative law is only partial. Despite its
relative inattention to institutional concerns, a course taught from this book
is much more likely to provide an alternative to legislation courses than to
administrative law. And in this respect, in my judgment, its most signiﬁcant
weakness (but not one that distinguishes it from other teaching materials on
the subject) is the consistency with which it makes students critics and not
actors, inviting them to the interpretive task after, and not before, judges and
administrators have performed it.
2. Samuel Estreicher & David L. Noll, Legislation and the Regulatory State49
Aside from the question about Langdellian change, Professors Samuel
Estreicher and David L. Noll’s Legislation and Regulatory State (recently published
in both print and electronic editions by LexisNexis with an available
documentary supplement) also has much to commend it for ﬁrst-year use.
Although appellate decisions are virtually the only primary materials its
detailed table of contents identify,50 the notes following them consistently
invite attention to case and doctrinal analysis issues reinforcing the book’s
overall “regulatory state” theme and important student habits.
 What is the procedural posture here?
 How was a described doctrinal issue analyzed?
 What other possibilities live in other cases or critical commentary?
 What was the justiﬁcation for regulation here?
 What was the mode of regulation employed?
 What alternatives were possible?
Congressional and executive branch institutions and practices are welldescribed, if somewhat idealistically.51 The notes often challenge the
49.

SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, LEGISLATION AND THE REGULATORY STATE (2015).
These paragraphs are based on prepublication materials the authors kindly provided in May
2015. Thus, some details may have changed.

50.

The exceptions are Federalist No. 10, E.O. 12,866, and the Customs Service letter that
eventuated in Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).

51.

Chapter 2, “The Legislative Process and Statutory Interpretation” draws on the works of
Robert Katzmann, and Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner in its discussions of statutory
interpretation, but not on works like Thomas Mann & Norman Orenstein’s prominent
scholarship on the current congressional disarray, or Abbe Gluck & Lisa Bressman’s study of
the realities of congressional drafting practice. In discussing presidential control of agency
action, the book commendably reproduces for discussion a well-edited text of one of Judge
Korman’s decisions respecting presidential pressure on the FDA’s decisions about over-thecounter availability of day-after-intercourse contraceptives, Tummino v. Torti, 603 F.Supp.2d
519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), but does not refer to Lisa Heinzerling’s The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for
Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927 (2014) or many other secondary works about presidential
thumbs on the scale.
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judicial analysis or raise interesting questions about its subsequent use, but
typically do so in relation to other judicial decisions or agency action. The
secondary literature is generally referred to, though not presented for active
consideration.52 The supplement provides many statutory texts, and also some
other-than-case primary materials such as are generally missing from this and
other primary sets of teaching materials.
A sense of the book’s strengths and weaknesses, the performance it does
and does not demand of the reader, might be provided by looking in some
detail at its treatment of a judicial opinion involving statutory interpretation.
Maracich v. Spears53 is the ﬁrst case students encounter in the materials on
statutory interpretation, and it is one of the three for which the documentary
supplement sets out statutes and legislative history excerpts. Several aspects
of it make it an especially good choice for this purpose. Like many of the
opinions in the book, it is contemporary. The issue it presents—whether a
federal statute possibly bans an attorney’s obtaining and using Department of
Motor Vehicles information about recent purchasers of automobiles to solicit
participation in a possible class action—is readily understood, apolitical,
and likely to command future attorneys’ interest. A decision in the matter
required the Supreme Court’s close analysis of statutory text and context
(and legislative history?). That decision was reached by a 5-4 margin; the
majority opinion adopted an interpretation of the text that was far from the
reading most easily given it and—perhaps most important to this appraisal—
rather dramatically departed from the usual conservative-liberal alignments
students might expect. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the Chief Justice,
and Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito, that the
attorney’s conduct violated the statute in an opinion suggesting but not
stating that he had consulted legislative history,54 and openly using many of
the tools of contemporary textualism. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (who
in somewhat similar “purpose and context v. plain meaning” circumstances
would ﬁnd purpose and context controlling in the very next case presented55),
dissented for herself and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena
52.

For more on the causes of statutory blind spots and the interpretative challenges they create,
see, for example, ROBERT KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014), JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY (Robert Katzmann ed. 1988); Amanda Frost, Certifying
Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler,
A Mechanism for Statutory Housekeeping: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 131 (2007); Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative
Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123 (1992); Victoria F.
Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 575 (2002).

53.

133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013).

54.

“Congress was aware that personal information from motor vehicle records could be used for
solicitation, and it permitted it in circumstances that it deﬁned, with the speciﬁc safeguard of
consent by the person contacted. So the absence of the term ‘solicitation’ in (b)(4) is telling.”
133 S. Ct. at 2203.

55.

Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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Kagan on the basis of what the statute plainly and permissibly said. Justices
Sotomayor, Thomas and Kennedy also switched sides in that next opinion
(Yates), one unusually rich with references to legislative history, and sharply
illustrating the diﬃculties courts face in mediating text and purpose. These,
then, are not cases that will feed student cynicism about the political valence
of Supreme Court decision.
If in teaching one made disciplined use of the documentary supplement that
accompanies the book, the juris-centric character of the main volume could be
eased. Students are asked to review the statute at issue in Maracich, reproduced
in the statutory supplement, before reading the opinion. The supplement
includes relevant excerpts from the act in question and selected legislative
history. Given a problem based on the case’s facts, students could have the
opportunity to experience the matter as a lawyer would have; this would
be the direct engagement with legislative history that Manning-Stephenson
denies its users. The book would permit similar exercises at least three times
over its course although, given the prominence and placement of the opinions
in the book, one supposes students might not easily resist the temptation to
shortcut that assignment. From the perspective of case and doctrinal analysis,
for students just beginning their legal education, the choice of this case is
excellent. It seems free from normative precommitments that might distract
its students; its presentation teaches valuable habits for entering students.
If, as one suspects, students ﬁnd the majority’s reading of the statute both
surprising and, in purposive terms, compelling, the lesson to explore possible
meanings of text before settling on an understood meaning is invaluable.
At the same time, it is only that. Supplement aside, here as elsewhere in the
book, the materials are about what courts do, not what attorneys do. Fresh,
imaginative and thorough, still Estreicher-Noll never places students where they
will often ﬁnd themselves, having to read a statute on a client’s behalf—often
with the most important consequences turning on their reading—without a
prior judicial reading to guide them. A teacher could ﬁll the gap, if so minded,
but the point here is that Langdell still rules—cases and doctrine are at the
core.56
3. Lisa Heinzerling & Mark Tushnet, The Regulatory and Administrative State57
Students taking Harvard’s course with Mark Tushnet and using his book—
the ﬁrst set of published materials designed for such a course58—would have
56.

So too with the book’s treatment of Executive Order 12,886, the core instrument of
presidential dialogue with agencies over their rulemaking activities. Estreicher and Noll
want their students to know what the Executive Order is and does, but never put their
students in the shoes of agency lawyers, or lawyers from private enterprise who might wish
to inﬂuence the process. Nor do they take the opportunity the order’s substance gives to
discuss the arguable virtues and faults of cost-beneﬁt analysis. The focus on judicial issues,
not the E.O. process as such, is striking.

57.

LISA HEINZERLING & MARK TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2006).

58.

Sidney A. Shapiro and Joseph P. Tomain had earlier published REGULATORY LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS, whose last (third) edition was published in 2003. It focused

Christopher Columbus Langdell and the Public Law Curriculum

175

a very diﬀerent experience from those studying with the Manning-Stephenson
materials. The lead materials named in the detailed table of contents are
primarily excerpts from the secondary literature, not judicial opinions.59
Agency documents occasionally appear. The book’s ﬁrst two parts present
regulation as an alternative to litigation, ﬁrst with respect to contracts, and
then to criminal law or torts.
 Do wages include a premium for taking risks?
 Are criminal law and tort eﬀective means for compensating persons for
strangers’ inﬂiction of unacceptable risks on them?
 Are they eﬀective in the case of diﬀuse, long-term (environmental)
harms?
The contrast both these parts oﬀer to contracts and torts (common-law
courses of the ﬁrst year) is strong and helpful in bringing student perceptions
of the legal order forward into the twenty-ﬁrst century. They make the case for
regulation as a necessity. Clearly enough, these materials have a point of view,
reﬂected in doubts cast on classical law-and-economics thinking, also wellpresented, and in the often gruesome facts of employer indiﬀerence to worker
safety and industrial indiﬀerence to environmental harms to be found in the
cases and secondary materials selected. But the ﬁnal chapter of these two parts,
“Linking Common Law and Statutes: The Case of Workers’ Compensation,”
is not merely a paean to regulation; it clearly communicates the ways in which
the “great compromise”60 of workers’ compensation programs left a good deal
of work for the courts and tort law to do in providing full compensation to
workers and safety incentives to management.
Part III, “The Modern Regulatory State,” introduces students to the
apparatus and procedures of regulation after ﬁve weeks or so of the course
is behind them. These will have been weeks in which they have studied a
good deal of interdisciplinary material—economics, sociology, cognitive
psychology—providing perspectives on situations (environmental harm,
workplace injuries) by which the common law is challenged and for which
regulation is common. Heinzerling and Tushnet’s modern regulatory state,
as they acknowledge, is one concerned with environmental, health, and safety
risks, the state of EPA, NHTSA and the FDA, not a ﬁnancial market (SEC) or
monopoly control (utility rate regulation) state; instructors interested in other
on the intellectual and legal grounding for regulation of various kinds—substance, methods,
and measures of eﬀectiveness—and not institutions or procedures as such. Congress,
statutory interpretation and the Administrative Procedure Act scarcely appear.
59.

Thirty-one judicial opinions appear in the detailed table of contents, HEINZERLING &
TUSHNET, supra note 57, at xvii-xxix; seventy-four excerpts from the literature, and ﬁve
other documents: a criminal indictment, an agency report to Congress, an agency decision
document, excerpts from an amicus curiae brief, and a White House memorandum to
agency heads. Id.

60.

See Alison D. Morantz, Rethinking the Great Compromise: What Happens When Large
Companies Opt Out of Workers’ Compensation? (July 10, 2015), available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2629498.
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areas would have to supply those “ribs.” The work takes up the basic issues
of statutory interpretation and rulemaking in a manner adequate to introduce
them, but that will not persuade any students that they have plumbed their
depths before returning to regulatory appraisal:






How can regulation fail, in theory or in practice?
What is cost-beneﬁt analysis, and the case for and against it?
Can providing risk-facing individuals with information to inform their
decision-making be an eﬀective alternative to command-and-control of
the situations they face?
If standards are to be set, how are acceptable levels of residual risk best
determined?

Christopher Columbus Langdell would not recognize these as proper law
school teaching materials. Interdisciplinary materials are as important to it, if
not more so, than judicial opinions. Understanding the use of the courts, here,
is only one of several options, not the ceaseless focus of a student’s attention.
Much more than the other texts considered to this point, these materials
continually place students outside the judicial system—usually, to be sure,
from the critical perspective of academics or citizens, and not as lawyers asked
to advise clients on matters of consequence to it. Both the understanding that
institutions other than the courts are important to the legal order and the
acquisition of critical tools for evaluating their work are important curricular
contributions in the current day. In taking students beyond doctrine and
beyond courts, as an introduction to the realities of today’s legal order and as
a corrective to Langdell’s “geology without rocks,”61 they are far superior to
doctrinally centered materials. Yet the extrajudicial materials of this book are
interdisciplinary, not the primary materials of today’s law practice. Exercises
like those possible with Estreicher-Noll’s Maracich materials would have to be
built from scratch.
4. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Abbe R. Gluck & Victoria Nourse, Statutes, Regulation,
and Interpretation—Legislation and Administration
in the Republic of Statutes62
Three of today’s most accomplished scholars of legislation—one of them an
editor of The Legal Process as ﬁnally published—have joined forces to produce
materials for a new course, one focused on the production and interpretation
of statutes and regulations, without being centered on courts.63 Thus, the
61.

See supra note 7.

62.

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA NOURSE, STATUTES, REGULATION,
AND INTERPRETATION—LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES
(2014) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION].

63.

Professor Eskridge has another dog in the hunt, the sixth of the sets mentioned in the prologue
to this section, one that will not be discussed in the text for reasons that will shortly appear.
The Fifth Edition of the pioneering materials he began with his co-editor on publication of
The Legal Process (the late Philip P. Frickey) has now been retitled as WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
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introductory materials will convey to students that ‘how legislatures think
about statutes’ and ‘how administrators think about statutes’ are just as
important to the enterprise as ‘how judges think about statutes.’ As will be
discussed, it is unfortunate that there is not equal analytic attention to “how
lawyers think about statutes” and “how aﬀected individuals think about
statutes,”64 but this fault is hardly theirs alone. In comparison with HeinzerlingTushnet and Bressman-Rubin-Stack, these materials give relatively little attention
to the issues of economic analysis, risk assessment, scientiﬁc judgment, and
human psychology that so aﬀect regulatory decision-making. (E.O. 12,866
and its administration, for example, are described, but the order itself is not
presented and the description of its operation and issues is largely in political
terms). For primary materials other than judicial opinions and some statutory
excerpts, students are directed to the place they can be found and are invited
to consult them—saving pages, but reducing the possibility of in-class use
and thus making that consultation less likely. Still, there is much to admire
here. Problems regularly set in its pages place students in active, practiceoriented roles. Particularly for teachers who understand, as Professor Gluck
has reported,65 that this course is much more likely to displace the course in
legislation than the course in administrative law, these new materials deserve
the most serious consideration.
The three-part introduction, imaginatively built oﬀ variations on the familiar
“No Vehicles in the Park” problem, might be regarded as a set piece like “The
Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes” in The Legal Process, though it is less richly
developed. After describing some of the ways judges think about statutes,
JR., PHILIP FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES & MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION—STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2014). In it,
brief materials in the ﬁrst chapter—also centered on the Civil Rights Act of 1964—introduce
agency implementation, and new Chapters 8 and 9, the ﬁnal quarter of the book, take up
administrative implementation of statutes and the theme and variations on Chevron. Like
the work discussed in the text, its introduction to administrative procedures is sketchy—the
APA provision governing informal rulemaking does not appear in text, and only about half
as many pages are addressed to that process (twelve) or to interpretive rules and policy
statements (twenty-two). It does, like Bressman, Rubin & Stack, have the advantage of
introducing the issues of presidential oversight subsequent to these pages. (Here, too, the
text of the Executive Order is relegated to an appendix.) Statutory interpretation cases, as
in the book discussed in text, are often preceded by the relevant text, a distinct improvement
over past practice. Problems are used, but less frequently, to place students outside the
courts; administrative agency documents scarcely appear. Probably the choice between the
two books would depend on how far the instructor wished to depart from the materials of
“Legislation,” for which both are excellent. There is more on Congress as a functioning
institution here than there, and less on agencies.
64.

The book’s preface properly notes as a contribution of the book that “we take a broader view
of the prototypical legal interpreter. In addition to judges, members of Congress, agency
oﬃcials, and even state actors are a part of the interpretive process in the modern, multilayered legal landscape.” But the prototypical legal interpreters are not only, even chieﬂy,
government oﬃcers, and a prototypical experience of the practicing attorney is having to
interpret laws, on issues of large potential consequence, without yet having their aid.

65.

See Gluck, note 40, supra.
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the ﬁrst problem invites students to consider the ordinance’s application
to a variety of ostensible “vehicles.” Then at the conclusion of an imagined
legislative process,
 How could students use the history that has been described, and ought
students be able to use that material, in appealing a conviction for a
child’s use of a tricycle in the park?
 And after introducing administrators who might have the authority to
deﬁne prohibited “vehicles,” can students draft a proposed rule?
 How should a commission respond to a supposed comment supporting
the inclusion of tricycles?
 How should it respond, having in mind both its political overseers, and
the possibility of engagement with the courts?
Students cannot avoid understanding that diﬀering institutions and procedures,
not only courts, are involved in the generation and interpretation of law; so,
too, will they understand that it is on their acts of law generation that the book
is resolutely focused. And the following materials, unsurprisingly, conﬁrm
this understanding, presented in three parts: an introduction to Congress,
agencies and courts; statutory interpretation; and agencies and administrative
implementation. The ﬁrst and third are resolutely multi-institutional; the
materials on interpretation focus on courts and judicial doctrine, subjects on
which all three authors are well-established scholars.
The ﬁrst part starts with attention to Congress, and then the executive
branch, President and agencies, before moving on to the courts. The legislative
process is introduced through the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
with particular attention to Rep. Howard Smith’s failed attempt to sabotage
the process by his successful introduction of an amendment prohibiting sex
discrimination. A problem requires students to advise their clients whether
they can safely take aﬃrmative action to redress decades of sex discrimination
in employment—but as an exercise in interpretation, without attention to the
possible consequences of either action or inaction that such clients would need
to consider. Following ample descriptions of House and Senate processes,
 How would students expect controversial legislation to proceed?
 Can students draft a bill?
 Get it past the veto gates?
Congress has a choice between courts and agencies as law enforcers; in
representing NOW or the Chamber of Commerce, how can counsel work
eﬀectively to inﬂuence the authority Congress gives the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission? A handful of separation-of-powers cases are
presented in considering constitutional limits on Congress’s authority to
control agency and presidential behavior, but the focus of these materials is
resolutely on the legislature and its behaviors.
The executive branch materials might more properly be described as an
introduction to the President, including his relationship to agencies. He is
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a presence throughout, with agencies and their functioning a subordinate
interest. One reads a lot about his removal, about Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer66 and about the War Powers Resolution (in connection with Libya)
before any agency action, as such, is introduced. Here, any primary reading
that is not a case involves advice to the President, a quasi-constitutional focus.
Then one encounters FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,67 preceded by a
discussion of the history of tobacco regulation by Congress and the FDA
and relevant statutory sections. Students are invited to consider statutory
arguments before reading the case, and one hopes they will—this is the sort
of problem/assignment too often missing from our statutory teaching. One
wonders, though—particularly given the chapter’s emphasis on the President
as well as agencies—why they are not then also shown the presidential directive
acknowledged in the following notes, or the agency’s regulation itself. These
are materials any lawyer considering the situation would have had and used.
Finally, there are some materials on cost-beneﬁt analysis (but not the executive
orders themselves), again emphasizing the President rather than the view from
inside the agency. An introductory problem, excellent from this perspective
and principally considering congressional-presidential-agency relations,
addresses OIRA pressures on the Department of Transportation respecting
the implementation of a new statute on pilot fatigue—but students see only
the statute and a descriptive account of subsequent events, and not the rule
nor any OIRA documents that might be discoverable.68 Rather, the materials
advise, ‘Pull up the Federal Register now and read the agency’s explanation.
. . . ’69 The implicit lesson is that these materials are secondary, not important
enough for inclusion in what students are required to read. The same contrast
recurs throughout the book.
A chapter on “The Courts,” and Part II (“Statutory Interpretation”) cover
familiar territory and cover it as imaginatively and well as one would expect
from these authors. These are the pages, along with the prior treatment of
Congress, that could excuse a law school from continuing to oﬀer legislation as
66.

343 U.S. 579 (1952).

67.

529 U.S. 120 (2000).

68.

In my experience, DOT has been much more assiduous than most other agencies to include
OIRA documents in its rulemaking dockets on the Federal Data Management Service, as
the executive orders direct, and apparently it did so here. The blog account on which the
authors rely in their description states, as they do not,
A red-lined version of the ﬁnal rule showing all the changes that had been made to
the draft while it was under OIRA review conﬁrms that this exemption was added during
OIRA’s review process. What’s more, the red-lined version shows that OIRA directed the
FAA to include new language in the rule’s preamble justifying this change solely on the basis
of cost-beneﬁt analysis, with clear disregard for applicable law and relevant science.
James Goodwin, Spurred On by Industry, OIRA Weakens Rule to Prevent Fatigue-Related Aviation
Catastrophes, CPR BLOG (May 30, 2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.
cfm?idBlog=9CA2427E-B023-E297-6E9CA1731AF03E99. How much more evocative of the
agency experience this problem would have been had this version been included in it . . . or
even given as a “pull up,” with a reference to where it could be found.

69.

HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 57, at 220.
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an upperclass elective if it oﬀered the course these authors imagine in the ﬁrst
year. For many of the cases, the authors do what, on the whole, materials on
statutory interpretation do not—set out the statutory portions at issue in front
of the case in which they are construed. This is a welcome advance, yet one
yearns for a further step. Students would be likelier to do some independent
reading if those portions were attended with a problem that could lead them
to the issues the court would have to resolve, as well as a precis of any materials
a lawyer would have in hand when presented with it. That could not prevent
students from looking ahead to see “if the butler did it,” but if they were able
to reach problems at the end of one class and opinions at the beginning of
the next, students might quickly come to appreciate the diﬃculties lawyers
face in reading statutes for their clients and to develop for themselves the
essential skill of seeing a statute as others might, and not just as they initially
do. Something like this does sometimes happen. The ﬁnal problem of “The
Courts” follows a considerable work-up of cases on Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act and pregnancy discrimination, and Congress’s consequent enactment
of a pregnancy discrimination act. How, now, should the EEOC approach
accommodation of breast-feeding, or workplace rules controlling exposure of
lactating or pregnant workers to toxic substances?
Part III (“Agencies and Administrative Implementation”) is less successful,
in my judgment, though readers might think the author of widely used teaching
materials on administrative law a biased observer. Since agency rulemaking is
the agency equivalent of statutory formation and has already been met several
times in the context of presidential-OIRA relations, one might imagine it
would receive close attention, but its treatment is summary indeed. The
governing section of the APA70 and Executive Order 12,866—the latter already
several times described but not seen—are not set out. Students never see the
documents of a rulemaking, either proposal or resulting rule; the only judicial
opinions provided as primary material (that is, rather than summarized in text)
concern substantive judicial review of rules, and the unspoken tension between
those opinions and the APA’s text is not addressed. Respecting the Executive
Order, students are given a Bush administration OMB circular describing the
process and are asked to evaluate its application to a rulemaking on prison
rape elimination; the authors provide a citation to where the regulatory impact
analysis might be found, but the text only summarizes the rule and the costbeneﬁt issues that might have been considered. Perhaps the skeletal nature
of this presentation was intended as an accommodation to the continuation,
in this course’s wake, of administrative law courses that must be left with
something to do. But in terms of providing a basis for understanding the
rulemaking process, including the Executive Order interactions, it falls well
short.
Although APA adjudication procedures are given only a paragraph’s
summary, the adjudication materials contain a well-developed series of materials
drawing on the FCC’s dispute with Fox Television Stations (and others) over
70.

5 U.S.C. § 553.
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the airing of indecent material. First, one encounters the FCC’s decision71—
one of only two administrative decision documents I found reproduced in
the book72—with good questions how it might have been understood and
applied; then, excerpts from the two Supreme Court decisions resulting from
the ensuing litigation;73 and ﬁnally, a request to advise the (new) Commission
what if any room it has to act, and what its procedural options are for doing so.
Engaging bundles like this, requiring students to act in awareness of political
as well as legal constraints and without complete guidance from judicially
developed doctrine, well ﬁt “The Legal Process” heritage and can distinguish
a course of this character from the ordinary law school fare. One simply wishes
there were more of them.
One cannot leave these materials without understanding, as the authors
insist, that “the doctrines of statutory law and administration are the bread
and butter of modern lawyers, and most of the time the modern regulatory
state is far ahead of the courts.”74 In this sense, Langdell has been overcome,
and perhaps the most important purpose of a contemporary introductory
public law course well-satisﬁed. If, as will be obvious, my preference remains
with the Bressman-Rubin-Stack materials about to be discussed, it is because of
the extent to which those materials require students to confront and use the
actual materials of the administrative state (that is, statutes, regulations, Federal
Register notices, and executive orders), reduce the domination of judicial
opinion, and introduce students to the economic, scientiﬁc, psychological,
and political considerations underpinning the contemporary debates about
rulemaking and its White House control.
4. Lisa Bressman, Edward Rubin & Kevin Stack, The Regulatory State75
Readers understanding the general editorial of these pages—a preference
for materials that often give students a diﬀerent experience than looking
over the shoulders of courts—will readily understand why these became my
preferred teaching materials for a regulatory state course once they were
published. In my judgment they exemplify, ﬁnally, the escape from Langdell
into the other legal worlds that mark today’s public law practice environment.
Reading a statute or a regulation or other congressional or agency materials
without an accompanying case is a common requirement in these materials,
as it is in practice. The materials thoroughly introduce Congress and agencies
as functioning institutions, and take the trouble to walk students through the
71.

HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 57, at 780.

72.

The other, the last reading in the course, is Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the Internal Revenue
Service’s response to United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); HEINZERLING & TUSHNET,
supra note 57, at 1009.

73.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) and FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012).

74.

HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 57, at 780.

75.

LISA BRESSMAN, EDWARD RUBIN & KEVIN STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE (2d ed. 2013).

182

Journal of Legal Education

conventional elements of statutes, rules and Federal Register notices—making
clear that, just like opinions, these are documents whose working parts a
lawyer needs to know. It is not all, or even chieﬂy, about judicial opinions and
doctrine, about the world as seen through judicial eyes.
The ﬁrst actor considered in these materials is the administrative agency,
not Congress, and the ﬁrst relationships explored are those internal to
the executive branch—the constitutional and the political issues around
independence and presidential control. Students will (properly) leave the
chapter understanding that the “independence” of independent regulatory
commissions is an interesting characteristic, but one whose inﬂuence over
agency behaviors may be marginal.76 The independents, too, are within the
President’s orbit; tables of organization look much the same, and removals
can come at a political price.
A chapter on “The Common Law as a Regulatory Regime,” like the materials
in Heinzerling-Tushnet, then invites consideration of the limitations of tort law
and the justiﬁcations for regulation—the ﬁrst in the context of automobile
safety, setting what will be the materials’ pervasive concern, and the second
with consideration of the economic and social justiﬁcations for regulation,
presented with considerable compression and without quite the same level of
normative loading as one ﬁnds in the other book. “Airbags 101” lays a factual
grounding for later problems—requires, then, decision-making that should
make plain to students attentive to their own mental processes the need for
and frequent diﬃculty of judgment in relation to technology—and opens a
brief discussion of the human problems of judgment under uncertainty.
After a standard description of the legislative process and brief attention
to academic theories respecting its operation, Chapter 3 turns to automobile
safety legislation—ﬁrst encapsulating the history of the National Traﬃc and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and relating it to these theories, and then
requiring students to read the whole Act, unedited. Students will not have to
read a case applying or interpreting this act for hundreds of pages. Rather,
they are invited to create an outline of the statute’s structure; then to read
lengthy excerpts from a Senate Report accompanying the bill that led to its
enactment; then to consider the Report’s aid in understanding the statute
itself; and then to consider the typical structure of a modern statute in relation
to it. The lesson is reinforced by having them read excerpts from ﬁve other
statutes of varying ages, and relate them also to statutory structure. In relation
to opinions, this is elementary stuﬀ that students learn to do from the ﬁrst day
of law school. Must they not also learn it in relation to statutes, which they
will often be encountering in their practice in just such a way? From this point,
the chapter proceeds to a brief (caseless) discussion of delegation issues, and
the basic steps and political realities of legislative drafting. Only then is there
a chapter on “Statutory Interpretation by Courts” that, in the usual way, and
largely by attention to cases, introduces the diﬃculties and tensions with a
76.

See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM.L.REV. 573 (1984).
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case (Holy Trinity)77 before taking students through ﬁrst the tools and then the
theories of interpretation. As in so many casebooks on the subject, students do
not come to the interpretive scene in each of these cases until after the court
has ruled, and then with only so much of the statutory framework as they can
ﬁnd in the court’s opinion. Opportunities for using the tools being taught
come in the notes.
“Statutory Implementation by Agencies,” the next chapter, begins by brieﬂy
describing both the APA rulemaking process (the executive order procedures
are not yet mentioned here; the development of the air bag standard largely
preceded them) and the back-and-forth about air bag requirements that
preceded the Reagan administration rule rescinding the passive-restraint
requirement. Its ﬁrst large task is to ask students to do for the documents of
rulemaking what they have already done for the NTMVSA—read ﬁrst the Federal
Register notice of proposed rulemaking and then the Federal Register publication
of the adopted rule,78 outlining their various parts, considering their reasoning,
and inviting the submission of “comments” should students ﬁnd unaddressed
matters that ought to be considered. They will not ﬁnd judicial consideration
of these matters until they have read another 323 pages; like the lawyers in that
ultimate case, they are on their own, aided by questions invoking particular
strands of possible analysis. The next primary reading is another ﬁnal rule
as published in the Federal Register (that is, together with its statement of basis
and purpose), this one from the Consumer Product Safety Commission
permitting further questions about the forms of analysis used. Succeeding
questions address issues of agency statutory analysis, providing Chevron79 (the
only case the student will encounter in the chapter) alongside a healthy dose
of Jerry Mashaw’s scholarship on the diﬀerences between judicial and agency
statutory interpretation; scientiﬁc analysis; economic analysis; and political
analysis. In each setting agency documents provide illustrations of discussions
that are developed largely by well-chosen excerpts from the literature. It is,
then, a chapter in which the student is constantly inside the agency or dealing
with it, living with its documents and concerns (including the political “help”
to be had as its work is done), and, for the moment, oblivious to the courts.
The ﬁnal chapter (“Control of Agency Action”) begins with the President
and Congress—introducing at last Executive Order 12,866 (which, typically,
is set out to be read before notes and questions about its structure and
functioning). It then calls attention to oversight hearings and the questions of
executive privilege that occasionally arise in resisting them, before returning
to notable “separation of powers” decisions limiting Congress’s role, and
then, ﬁnally, to “Judicial Control of Agency Action.” This part well covers the
material an administrative law class would treat in considering standards and
availability of judicial review; but no student will think that teaching judicial
77.

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).

78.

Federal Register notices, throughout, are published in Federal Register format, as if photocopied—
adding perhaps to the reality of the encounter.

79.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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doctrine is the central ambition of this course. It is an introduction to lawyers’
roles in the regulatory state, an introduction in which judicial decision plays
a decidedly subsidiary role. The contrast with Manning-Stephenson, with its
Langdellian roots, could hardly be stronger.
The very last section (a “case study” in control) presents a chronological
set of materials associated with the development of the air bags standard, for
which the ground was laid by “Airbags 101,” from its inception through the
immediate aftermath of Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Mutual Ins. Co.80 As usual, most the documents here concern actions by the
agency, the White House or Congress, including transcripts of remarkable
White House tapes from the Nixon administration. The one exception is
Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transportation,81 a 1972 Sixth Circuit decision. That decision
found fault with the “objectivity” of the dummies with which compliance with
the passive-restraint requirements of Standard 208 were to be tested (and
with the accommodation to their limits NHTSA had proposed), but left in
place an ignition interlock requirement NHTSA had intended as an interim
measure only.82 The political ﬁrestorm resulting from consumer resentment of
the interlocks, as Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst have so well recounted,83
produced statutory changes that delayed passive-restraint requirements for
two decades, at the cost of tens of thousands of avoidable highway deaths.
The authors of this book are an estimable and complementary set of
scholars. Lisa Bressman’s recent work has contributed remarkably to our
empirical understandings both of White House-agency relationships84 and
the contemporary realities of statute-making in the Congress. Edward Rubin’s
grounding in political science and philosophy, and understanding of the
deﬁciencies of Langdellian methodology,85 bring with them an astounding
breadth of view about what administrative law might be. Kevin Stack, the
youngest of the three, has contributed importantly to the understanding of
80.

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

81.

472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).

82.

472 F.2d, at 675. I have had students read the case when they read the Act. I do so to
sensitize them to the importance of identifying possible meanings of statutory words they
instinctively believe they have understood just by reading them. In one class they must
consider whether the “objective criteria” of Section 102(2) and “objective terms” of Section
103(a) are required for testing mechanisms as well as the safety equipment itself, and the
information they would want to have to advise Chrysler on this question. Then they get
to read the opinion, questionably ﬁnding in the aﬃrmative, with little more to support the
result than the court’s understanding of “objective.”
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See MASHAW & HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTOMOBILE SAFETY, supra note 4.
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Lisa Bressman & Michael Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice
of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2006).

85.

See Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV.
609 (2007). Rubin accepted the deanship of Vanderbilt Law School on the understanding,
inter alia, that he could build this course as a ﬁrst-year requirement.
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old chestnuts86 and contemporary puzzles87 and, as remarked at the outset,
has redirected our attention to what was lost when administrative law turned
Langdellian, turned to a study of courts and doctrine.88 The authors have
produced an eﬀective antidote.
Conclusion
The contributions of Jerry Mashaw, William Eskridge and other Yale
instructors to our understanding of the real world of law notwithstanding,
the curriculum at Yale remains essentially what it was when I became its
student 54 years ago—and long before that. Courses in professional ethics, and
requirements to take skills courses and to complete two substantial writing
requirements, have been added subsequently, but not a course requiring
understanding of the real world of today’s law. Perhaps Yale’s students,
brilliant as they are, are not misled by the endurance of Langdell’s curriculum
well past its senescence. Yet one might still think that the deepest recognition
of Professor Mashaw’s remarkable contributions to our understanding
of that real world, its history and its operation today, will come when Yale
joins the many law schools now requiring their students to take a course on
legislation and regulation in their ﬁrst year—if, of course, it is taught outside
the Langdellian model.

86.

See Kevin Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007).

87.

See Kevin Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012).

88.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

